
6 7/ 



KEY TO THE DEAD LOCK. 



SPEECH 



OF 



HON. SAMUEL S. COX, 

OF NE^Y YORK, 

IX THE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

FOR 

ADHERENCE TO RETRENCHMENT, 
Saturday, June 17, 1876, 

ON THE 

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE RELATING TO APPROPRIATIONS. 

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Has not'experience verified tlie utility of rc=-u'aining money 
biUs to tlie iiumediate representatives of the people? — 2Iadi- 
son Papers, volume 3, page 1313. 






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SPEECH 



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HOX. SAMUEL S. COX. 



On tile President's message relating to appropriations . 

Mr. COX said : 

I would not take up the time of tlie House now except for certain 
imputations which have been tlirown on the famous retrencliment. 
rule. VM. This rule I had the honor to introduce from the Committee 
on Kules. It is my pleasure to defend it. Besides, I si)eak because 
of remarks made by the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania 
[Mr. Kklley] in relation to the Committee on Banking and Currency 
and the silver bills. 

BAXKIXG AXD CL'RRKXCV COMMITTEE IiElEXDED. 

As to the last matter,det me say that the House will recollect that 
at the beginning of this session there was a discussion as to which 
committee should take charge of the currency busiues.s. It was con- 
tended by gentlemen on one side that the Committee of Ways and 
Means was the only proper committee, because the greenback was 
currency, and because, being a debt also, it had charge of it by vir- 
tue of raising ways and means to support the Government. It was 
argued that to it lielonged the exclusive jurisdiction on that sub- 
ject. It was contended, on the other hand, that the Committee on Bank- 
ing and CiUTency should take control. As the author of the measure 
dividing the old Ways and Means into three committees, I was com- 
pelled to speak. My remarks were to the effect that it would be 
well if all the wise men of both committees and in Congress should 
give their liest attention and judgment to the solution of our most 
difficult and perilous problem. But the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
took great care in that debate to assume for his Coumiittee of Ways 
and Means that it was the only committee which should have the 
power to consider and report such measures. Now, sir, when he com- 
plains of the committee of which I am chairman, may I ask if any 
report has ever come from the Committee of Ways and Means? Cur- 
rency bills have been referred to it as to my committee. We have 
reported something to remonetize silver. Has his committee reported 
anything / 

Mr. KELLEY. Will the gentleman allowme to state my position ? 

Mr. COX. I prefer not to yield now. 

Mr. KELLEY. Let me say that I held that the Committee of 
Ways and Means had the right over the money and bonds, and that 
the currency or bank paper belonged to the Committee on Banking 
and Currency. 

Mr. COX. It is enough to say that we have had no report on money 
or greenbacks or .-my kind of currency from the Committee of Ways 
and Means. But why should I blame it on account of this? No 



4 • 

committee of this House, no party in this House, has heeii ready 
thus far to make a satisfactory report. Nor has the receut cou- 
Yeution of the republicau people at Cincinnati given any definite 
couchision on that matter. All conolnsious have heen general and 
inconclusive. There are no remedies proposed. Why, sir, iu Cincin- 
nati the other day, was it an uncertain or a certain 'sound as to the 
repeal of this resumption law ? I say to the House what I said the 
other day, that the Committee on Banking and Currency will take 
that matter up for consideration as soon as a quorum appears. We 
have no desire to postpone it now that a privilege is afforded us tore- 
l)ort at any time. A quorum will Ije here on Monday. All intima- 
tions of disinclination to consider and report on that critical question 
will be easily repelled by the frankness and future action of that 
committee which has been peculiarly honored by the House. 

THE GKEAT EULE OF RETRENCHMENT — 120. 

But the matter now before the House is brought here by the message 
of the President. It is signiticaut of conflict, and calls for pluck, 
faith, virtue, and popular deliance. The debate from one side is an 
attack ou Rule 120 as amended. The ol^ject of the amendment of 
"that rule, as gentlemen know very Avell, was to allow the Committee 
ou Appropriations to retrench and reduce expenditures and salaries. 
The object of the old rule, I do not care by whom enacted, was to 
allow them only to increase. 

"It has been decided," says Barclay, (page 16,) "that under Rule 
120 it is not in order to propose an amendment to a general appro- 
priation bill vt'hich changes existing law." Ijut ou the same page it 
is said that it was also decided that the latter branch of the rule not 
only permitted amendments increasing salaries, but was framed for 
that very purpose. 

Increase only ! Not decrease at all. No wonder this new Congress, 
fresh from an impoverished and indignant people, desired more virtue 
iu our rules as well .as rulers. What virtue comes from the new rule, 
which strikes out increasing and inserts its opposite, is due to the 
honest gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Holman] or the Committee on 
Rules, who reported that peculiar amendment which he sent to us. 
It is duo as well to the House which has so gallantly sustained the 
Appro]iriation Committee in giving eftect to the amended rule. From 
this fountain of pure legislation will come what relief a fi-ugal peo- 
j)le will receive from the exactions of profligate legislatures and a 
more profligate administration. , 

The amendment from the Committee on Rules was intended to re- 
move our disability to economize. It passed with some disgruntling 
remarks from gentlemen opposite. It has had several ordeals, but it 
has come out thus far burnished and purified. Its results arc seen iu 
the various reductions which I will hereafter refer to. 

HOW THE SENATE EECEH^ED THE EETEEXCHIXG RULE. 

It may be proper to say that the Senate received it in no pleasant 
mood ; and their action upon the liills passed under its auspices 
shows plainly that the reform it would work is not acceptable to that 
body. They fear it will encroach upon their prerogative, or that it 
will repeal bad laws. However, I venture to say that there was no 
other mode left to kill the parasite alike with the monster which 
had been so long eating up the siil>stance of the people by ordinate 
salaries and scandalous outlays. Besides, it was framed in the very 
spirit of the best parliamentary law. If it he an innovation, it is a 
wise one, for what does it not save through the agency of fresh and 
just legislation ? 



ENGLISH ANALOGIES AS TO RULE 120. 

Au anthill itative w-riter, Mr. May, speaking of the English system, 
reminds ns that the Honse can entertain any motion for diminisliing 
a tax or charge upon the people; and bills are fi-equently brought iu 
for that purpose without the formality of a committee. All rules 
are opposed to the imposition of burdens, but not to their removal or 
alleviation. This is a principlo laid down by Gushing, ^ 2039. In- 
stances of the value of this principle mnj be given pertinent to our 
newly-amended Rule r20. as wlien blanks are left for salaries, rates, 
Arc. "^These are tilled up in committee, but on the report the House 
may reduce their amount. To increase requires recommittal. So, too, 
deductions from custom duties may be entertained Ijy the House, but 
payments out of the revenue must be considered in committee. If, 
therefore, the Senate objects to the reductions of our appropriations, 
we plant ourselves upon this priceless principle, lying at the root of 
parliamentary law and frugal legislation, uaiuely, to guard closely 
and make facile the blessed privilege of retrenchment : consider long, 
heedfully, carefully, and jealously the dangerous privilege of increas- 
ing burdens. Whereas, as I have shown, under our rule of many years' 
standing, only amendments on appropriation bills were allowed so as 
to increase, the new order plainly recognizes the sacred, traditional, 
rational, and invaluable popular right of curtailing expenditures! 
To this branch of Congress belongs the credit of building this smooth 
and broad highway to reform. Without it all jjlatforms and pUxt- 
itudes, all promises and irretentions to economy are as ashes I 

MENACE FKOJ[ EXECUTIVE AND SENATE. 

Yet we are confronted at the closing of this Congress with the men- 
acing challenge of the Senate. We have sent to them our bills, framed 
in the spirit of economy. The consnlar and di[ilomatic bill was passed 
here after much difficulty and contention, but it passed almost unan- 
imously. The Senate at once disagrees with the House. The legisla- 
tive, jiulicial, and executive bill, which had forty days and forty 
nights of a deluge of debate, passed almost unanimously. The Senate 
assumes and x)resumes at once to usurp our function. By a thousand 
amendments it would make it not only a new bill substantially, but 
would thereby resuscitate the old bills, as to which the popular rein-o- 
batiou is fresh and uncompromising. Our other bills are to share the 
same treatment. Let us meet this contest a Voutrance. Let ns be 
patient. The people are behindsus. Let the House stand upon the an- 
cient ways. Let us re-assert its undoubted privilege. No prerogative 
of power, no assumption of equality in this matter, is to be tolerated. 
No pretentions dignity or increasing usurxiation of power on the part 
of the Senate will excuse the representatives of the people from tlie 
courageous performance of their duty. If tliese liills fail and the very 
organism of government itself stops, as is threatened by the menacing 
message read to-day, for want of the motive power, the corrective will 
be applied by the popular mandate, from which there is no appeal, 
and before which the Senate is impotent. 

There is, therefore, in this dilemma no other course for us but re- 
sistance to encroachment. If the Senate will copy the example of 
the House of Lords in some of its attempts to encroach on the Com- 
mons, let them at once make it a standing order to "reject at sight" 
all of our appropriati(m bills. Much better and braver would be this 
contemptuous treatment than the lu-etenseof considering our bills iu 
detail only to reject them en bloc. 

JEALOUSY OF THE SENATE. 

It is in the beauty of proportion and its compensations of power 



6 

that our Government finds its best eulogy. Let one brancli eucroacli 
upon another, and it will become as Mr. Jiladison once said of Greece : 
she was undone as soon as the King of Macedou obtained a seat 
among the Amphictyons. It was not alone the monarchical form of 
the new confederate, but the disproportionate and disturbing force. 
Give to the Senate a power over appropriations ungranfced and 
pernicious, and you not only give it a force in our Federal economy 
ilisproportioued and jarring to the general harmony, but you place 
upon the House itself a responsibility, disproportioued to its power. 
I would not place too much confidence in the Senate. It may be as 
fatal as too much jealoiisy of the people. If a Senate which comes 
within one vote of impeaching Andrew Johnson, to aggrandize its 
own power, could thus arrogate more than it should, are we not wise 
to be jealous of its power when it would breed confusion and dis- 
content by tamperiug with or denying great reforms made by the 
popular decree and by the popular branch f 

TAXATION THE GItEAT ISSUE IN ADMINISTRATION. 

History teaches that in all contests for power between the governed 
and the government and between dift'erent departments of the gov- 
ernment, the question of taxation is not only the most sensitive, but 
the most potential for good or ill. From the early exactions of the 
oriental despots and their satrapies down to the largesses of the last 
Turkish Sultan, which worked his dethronement and suicide ; from 
the embattled protests written in Gaelic blood in the time of the 
Eoman Ciesars, down to the wild sanguinary scenes of the French 
revolution; from the early protests of the "gentlemen of Eugland" 
in her Commons against the exactions of the Plantagenets and Stuarts 
to the last allowance for the children of Queen Victoria; from the 
times of Hampden and ship-money and Samuel Adams and tea-tribute, 
which cements by a priuciple England with her colonies, and both 
with Magna Charta and the declarations and bills of right, down to the 
present dissolute extravagance and corruption of the Federal officials 
in this Capitol and elsewhere, and from the large cities of the sea- 
board to the remotest border, where the post-trader plies his ill-gotten 
trade for ill-gotten gain, the perversion of the taxiug and appropri- 
ating power,"which wrests supplies from the peojjle, has been watched 
with jealousy and attacked with determination. 

This Congress will not shame the history of its origin, nor degrade 
the lofty ])rivilegcs granted to it by the"^ Constitution. It will not 
allow them to be abridged or frittered away by making itself the 
supple slave to an exacting Senate or a gras])ing Executive. It is, 
by organic law on this matter, the master. 

SEXATOEIAL ASSUMPTION. 

I am not sure that it might, mahjr^ all usage to the contrary, be 
held that the Senate has no more' right to originate or destroy the 
fundamental propositions or substance of our monetary reform bills 
than it has to pass bills of attainder, (?j^j>osf/«c/o orretros])ectivelaws. 
When it has proposed amendments, and we do not concur, is it not 
its duty to yield formally to the House ? Is not the House the egg 
or source of the only money bills to be passed ? Does merely jjrojws- 
ing an amendment give the right to defeat or reject the bill alto- 
gether ? 

A distinguished English parliamentary writer, Mr. Hatsell, rejects as 
precedents all the proceedings of both Houses from 1641, when Charles 
I went to the Commons to arrest its members, until the restoration. 
May we not ask, are not all recent preceilents found in the Senate over- 



steppiug the express coustitntioual privilege of the House to the con- 
trol of money bills equally valueless ? If it were not so, would not an 
architect who is consulted as to alterations in a house claim the right 
to tear down and build anew ? May not this peculiar authority of the 
House as to money bills excluding the Senate from any proprietorship 
in the substantial legislation be the very method intended to prevent 
the " dead-lock " so often threatened and so often feared ? May it 
not be the plan adopted by the sages of the Constitution to keep the 
wheels running without hazard of losing supplies by conflicting 
bodies ? 

Btit it is not necessary to assume or assert so much as this jiroposi- 
tiou involves. It is enough to say now to the House as a matter of 
political ethics: Stand on your superior vantage-ground ! Adhere to 
your own rule of action and your own principle of retrenchment ! 
Bate not a jot of heart or hope, but press right onward to the relief 
of a deficient Treasury and a plundered people ! Thus acting you 
will be crowned with the approbation of a grateful constituency. 

THE COXSTITUTIOXAL PROVISION. 

In this grapple between the representatives of State sovereignties 
an<t the representatives of the people it would be as well before the 
final struggle and test to know precisely in what consist the respect- 
ive elements of strength. What is their vigor as derived from the 
Constitution ? If in seeking this knowledge we find our quarrel just 
we shall have the added strength of conscious rectitude, and we will 
not fail. 

The fii'st clause of the seventh section of the first article of the 
Constitution declares that — 

All biHs for raising rovenne shall originate in tlie Honseof Representatives; but 
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills. 

Now, what is meant by bills for raising revenue ? Does the clause 
apply to all "money bills," and does it include '' aiipropriation bills ?" 
I maintain that it does, and that that was the meaning of the clause. 
JBills for spending as we'll as for the raising of money are to be consid- 
ered as belonging in their origin to the House. "All clauses," says 
Cushing, "relative to taxation are divisible into two classes, namely, 
those which relate to raising revenue only and, second, those which 
embrace both the raising and spending of money." The constitu- 
tions of New Hampshire and Massachusetts use the term " money 
bills" to include the raising and appropriation of money. In Georgia, 
and perhaps in other States, appropriating moneys is used in order to 
be more cautious and definite. 

CON'TEMPORAXEOUS DISCUSSION. 

In the discussion of this clause in the constitutional convention, as 
will api)ear in Madison's Deljates, volume 3, pages lb06, et seq., all the 
eminent debaters regarded " money bills " as within the signitication 
of " revenue." To origiuate and tax, to tax and appropriate was, by 
the constitutional fathers, considered grouped in one subject — " money 
bills." "Money bills" — the exact language of English statesmen — 
had reference to all uses of the money raised. 

ENGLISH DEFINITIOXS OF MOSEY BILLS. 

In order, however, accurately to define the constitutional clause, we 
go with the commentator Judge Story to its source. He makes no 
question as to the origin of this clause : 

It is borrowed from the British House of Commons, of which it is the ancient and 
indisputable privilei^e and right, that all grants of subsidies and parliamentary aid,s 



8 

shall begin in their house, and are first bestowed by them, although their grants 
are not effectual t« all intents and purposes until they have the assent of the other 
two branches of the legislature. (2 Story, ^ 831.) 

BLACKSTONE AND STORY AS AUTHORITY. 

Blackstoiie, with his ti.sual perspicuity, enforces the statement of 
Story by a clear statement of the fitnctions of the Commons in this 
relation. I quote from his first book, page 169 : 

The peculiar laws and customs of the House of Commons relate principally to 
the raising of taxes and the election of members to serve in Parliament. 

First, with regard to taxes, it is the ancient, indisputable privilege and right of 
the House of Commons that all grants of subsidies or parliamentary aids do begin 
in their house and are first bestowed by them ; although their grants are not ef- 
fectual to aU intents and purposes until they have the assent of the other two 
branches of the legislature. The general reason given for this exclusive privilege 
of the House of Commons is that the supplies are raised upon the body of the peo- 
ple, and therefore it is proper that they alone should have the light of taxing them- 
selves. • 

But such an experiment will hardly be repeated by the Lords under the present 
. improved idea of the privilege of the House of Commons, and in any case where a 
money bill is rem.inded to the Commons all amendments in the mode of taxation 
are sure to be rejected. 

In reading the history of similar legislation in England, I find in 
May's Parliamentary Practice that we are conforming to the English 
mode in this respect. I shall take leave (by the favor of the House) 
to make some elaborate remarks upon this subject. They touch the 
constitutional functions of the House. They are entirely unpartisan 
in conception as in delivery. 

The English system as to appropriation bills allows iieculiar privi- 
leges for retrenchment — never for increase except under extraordi- 
nary circumstances ; and shall we, the representatives of the American 
people, — we who are specially charged with the initiation of. money 
bills — shall we be behind the Commons of England in claiming the 
privilege which they fought for against the prerogative of the Crown 
and the assumptions of the Hoi;se of Peers ? I trust there is spirit 
enough in this House, irrespective of party, to maintain its organism 
as it was intended to be and as it was niodelediifter the English system. 

Why, sir, do not gentlemen know that to-day in the House\of Peers 
they dare not amend an appropriation bill from the Commons, but 
that perfunctorily and with certain formalities they assent, and "as- 
sent" only to those bills making approiiriations ? 

Let me quote from Mr. May : 

The legal right of the Commons to originate grants cannot be more distinctly 
recognized than by these various proceedings ; and to this right alone their claim 
appears to have been confined for neariv three hundred years. " The Lords were not 
originally precluded from amending bills of supply ; for there are numerous cases 
in the joiuuals in which the Lords' amendments to such bills were agreed to ; but 
in 1671 the Commons advanced their claim somewhat further by a resohnng nem. 
con., " That in all aids given to the king by the Commons the rate or tax ought not 
to be altered; " and in 1()78 their elaini was urged .so far as to exclude the Lords 
from aU power of amending bills of supply. On the 3d of July, in that year, they 
resolved — 

" Th.at all aids and supplies and aids to His Majesty in Parliament are the sole 
gifts of the Commons ; and all bills for the granting of any such aids and supplies 
ought to begin with the Commons; and it is the undoubted and sole right of the 
Commons to direct, linjit, and appoint in such bills the ends, purposes, considera- 
tions, conditions, limitations, and qualifications of such grants, which ought not to 
be changed or altered by the House of Lords." It is upon this latter resolution 
that all proceedings between the two houses in matters of supply are now founded. 

The principle is acquiesced in by the Lords, and, except in eases when it is diffi- 
cult to determine whether a matter be stiictly one of supply or not, no serious 
difference can well arise. The Lords rarely attempt to make any but veibal alter- 
ations in which the sense or intention is not affected ; and even in regard to these, 
when the Con)mon8 have accepted them, they have made special entries in their 
journal, recoi-ding the character and objects of the amemlmeuts and their reasons 



9 

for a^ecing to them. So strictly is the i.iiiiciple observed in all matters affecting- 
the iiiiblic revenues that where certain pavineiits have beeu directed by a bill to be 
made into and out of the consolidated fund, the Commons have refused to permit 
the Lords to insert a clause providing that such pavmeuts should be made under 
the same regulations as were applicable by law to other similar payments. 

This would seem to make it clear that all o;rautsor appropriations, 
all parliamentary aids to the executive in the shape of moneys, are 
nuderstood as connected with the raising-of revenue. The mere rais- 
ing of it by taxation is no pleasant privilege and no salutary safe- 
guard. The spending of the money for specific objects of pul)lic good 
IS the higher privilege and riglit. 80 it has been regarded in a ma- 
jority of the States where corresponding provisions are inserted as to 
the origin of such money bills. 

How far the House may go in tacking on legislation not strictly be- 
longing to revenue or appropriation is a study for the philo.sophic 
8tate.smau. He will find its practice by no means uniform. Although 
in England the Lords have endeavored to check this mode of legisCi- 
tion, yet here it may be au open and debatable question. But in'^snch 
an exigence as thepresent condition of our business and affairs I would 
not hesitate to tack remedial provisos and conditious to the disburse- 
ment of public money, so as to effectuate reform and stop prodigality. 
The House has not hesitated ; and if it awakens a tempest at the 
other end of the Capitol, it will only prove a summer tluinder-storm, 
with a clearer blue and a imrer atmosphere in the skv after it is over. 

It is not difficult to tra'ce the reason of this constitutional right. 
Blackstone explains it, and the parliamentary history of England 
illustrates his explanation. The Conmions represents the people, and 
tlie supplies come from the body of the people. It is their estate 
which is administered when supplies are voted. The Lords came in 
originally for a small modicum of the power only because they held a 
largeshareof the property of the realm ; a reason whichinuovalidsense 
applies to our Senate, which represents not their own estates, nor the 
people, nor their property. If the Senate may simply propose amend- 
ments or simply concur in them, it does not derogate from the high 
privilege of the commonalty to restrain lavish and improvident jTp- 
propriations. To allow the Senate to concur is easy and p'easiug ; to 
allow them to propose amendments is respectful and courteous; but 
to allow them to so propose as to add immense sums to gratify the 
craving of a greedy Executive and a horde of salaried parasites, is to 
place 111 peril of explosion or escape the very motive-power for the 
machinery of government. To allow the Senate to lyiect onr bills, to 
permit radical alterations, and to change the condit'ions of the dis- 
bursement of money— would it not give the Senate equal power witli 
the House in raising and spending money? "Would it not nullify and 
render meaningless the clause of the Constitution which Judge Story 
derives from the British constitution ? Would it not in effect destroy 
the ef|uilil)riuin of the Federal system, by giving to Nevada, with its 
fifty thousand people and its bonanza Senators, a power of taxation 
to nullify New York, with its five millions of people and its diffused 
wealth! Was the equality of the States intended to be outside of 
the Constitution or within it ? If within it. then Nevada in money 
bills must remain as to New York as 1 in 100. This is the very his- 
tory of the compromise by which this debatable clause was fixed in 
the Constitution. 

Judge Story says that the same reasons do not exist to the same ex- 
tent, for the same exclusive right in our House of Representatives in 
regard to money bills asexist for such a right in the Houseof Commons. 
Had he lived to seethe demoralizing results of our civil war ; had he 



10 

read our investigations aud reports of malfeasance iu office ; had he 
observed the teudeucy of the Senate to grow in jjower by the patron- 
age it fed on ; had he seen governors of States newly elect rnsh 
from their local capitals to secnre the cnrule chair of the Senate for 
its six years of easy dignity, unrestricted patronage, and self-content- 
ed power ; had he seen the luxury of living, the frippery of fashion, 
the magnificence of our Federal city, the mushroom growth of mere- 
tricious ostentation, the pride of official presumption, and the long 
retinue of obsecxuious clientage which follows in the wake of sena- 
torial dignity, not to speak of the pomp of, the unrepresentative 
southern Senator or the liveried carriage of a northern Senator ; had 
he seen tlie senatorial fasces united to scourge Andrew Johnson, a 
faithful Executive, for resisting senatorial decrees, he would have 
found many counterparts in our day to remind him of the worst days 
of Eoman decline, and many reasons which did not occiu- to him as a 
contemporary of Clay, Webster, and Calhoun for the almost exclusive 
right of the House over that senatorial patronage which can only live 
by confirmations and supplies. 

Was it not enough to give to the Senate a part of the treaty-making 
power and the exclusive confirming jjower as to Federal api)oiut- 
ments ? Was it not enough to give'the Senate the veto over the Ex- 
ecutive will as to his subordinates? Granting these powers, why 
does not the same reason exist here as iu England for the deposit of 
this dangerous purse power iu the House? Is not the lower House 
here, as in England, presumed to be nearer the fountain of popular 
will and intelligence ? Does it not more readily, both as to time and 
desire, answer the popular call to hinder all evil courses in the Execu- 
tive Departments? Has it not more speedy means to investigate 
misconduct and punish aud impeach? Has it not more ample sources 
of special and local information? Does it not, as with electric touch, 
on instant urgency, expose and rei^reseut the very whims and caprices, 
if you please, or what is better, the opinions and feelings, of the peo- 
ide ? Do not its members, by telegraph and mail, by newsi)ai)ers aud 
record, by more familiar acquaintance and intercourse, reach the popu- 
lar ear aud more readily obtain the i>opular verdict? Are they not, 
therefore, every two years, if not every session or week, dependent on 
the popular wish for support, for honor, for comfort in duty aud 
solace in trial, for succor in emergency as to character and standing; 
in fine, for those sustaining pillars and ornamental graces which 
make office an honorable trust, and its service an ennobling mark of 
dignity? Aud^\•hen it comes to the imposition of taxes, or the pay- 
ment of money drawn from toil, will they not be more heedful and 
vigilant than a body whose tenure of office is more permaneut and 
less democratic, aud whose habits and position are less popular and 
more aristocratic ? 

In answeringthesequestions, it is readily ascertained why the House 
is more changeable as to its composition, iu meu and parties ; why it is 
iu emergencies the only refuge against wrong and corruptiou ; why the 
people who are depressed and distressed astotheir agricultural, com- 
mercial, or manufacturing interests look first to the popular branch 
for relief. The Senate is not a help ; it is a clog to popular relief. 
It is so by the very nature of its constitution. Wholesome legislation 
is not to be expected of it, as from the House. From the latter should 
and do generally spring those measures which ameliorate aud bless. 

Even in the States where the tenure of senators is less than that 
of the Federal Senators, the provision of the constitutions as to money 
bills and their origin is preserved. Some of the States, in their early 



11 

history, even gave to the lower braucli exclusive jurisdiction over such 
measures. 

BRITISH ri!ECEliEXTS. 

But all such clauses point to the British constitution. In the light 
of that nel>ulous, unwritten, but remarkable entity we find the rea- 
sons for their existence ; ay, sir, we find in them motives as pure as 
ever animated Cato or Sydney, Hampden or Washington, for the 
maiutenance of our right, now sought to be intrenched upon by the 
Senate, and as to which we are admouislicd in an amazing way by the 
President's message. just read. 

It is both instructive and pertinent to this incjuiry to consider the 
growth of the Commons' right of supply. At first the exactions were 
of feudal origin ; all aids to the Crown, however, in the times of the 
Tudois were freely voted by Parliament. 

Judge Story, in his Comnientaries on the Constitution in regard to 
that clause which says that the lower House of Congress shall have 
the origination of money bills and the Senate only can jn-opose amend- 
ments or concur with them, gives tlie reason for that rule. 

Mr. KASSON. Does my friend also claim that the Constitution 
provides that this House alone shall originate appropriation bills ? 

Mr. COX. I will come to that in a moment ; I see it is troubling 
the gentleman. ■ ' 

Mr. KASSON. Not at all; it seems to trouble the two gentlemen 
from New York. The phrase in the Constitution is "Ijills for raising 
revenue." 

Mr. COX. It has been interpreted by many of the States and by 
many of our commentators that the term " bills for raising revenue " 
includes all money bills. In some States the constitutions contain 
the words " approjiriation and money bills." But according to our 
practice, according to the general interpretation, according to the 
reasons that lie below, and, as I shall show, according to the debates 
in the constitutional convention, that clause of the Constitution it- 
self is the true source of this moneyed power. It incliules appropria- 
tions. It is the old power of the Commons to hold the purse against 
the sword. For six hundred years in England it fought royalty with 
its prerogatives, backed by the usurping insolence of the peers. It 
has only been modified in this country because the Senate happens to 
represent sovereign States ; but, as Judge Story well says, the House • 
is nearer to the people ; it is more frequently elected ; it has more 
local information, and hence therefore originates money bills; and 
the House, if they are firm and honest, if they are parliamentary in 
the old heroic Saxon mold, should demand from the Senate that their 
prerogatives should not be interfered with, esj)ecially when the people 
demand it. 

Mr. HURLBUT. Do I understand the gentleman from New York 
to consider that the Senate of the United States is in any manner 
analogous to the hereditary House of Peers in England ? 

Mr. COX. I only repeatVhat Judge Story says ; I do not now pro- 
fess to judge upon this matter myself. If my citations (which I ask 
leave to print) are read and properly considered, they will helY>to dis- 
entangle us, or at least be a key to the deail-lock which threatens us. 

But, Mr. Speaker, I did not propose to speak A'ery long or to speak 
at all upon this question. It is perhaps a little indelicate for me, sit- 
uated as I am, to come down upon the fioor and speak at all after the 
suggestion made the other day by my friend from Massachusetts 
[Mr. HoAii] who is absent. 

But one thing ought to be borne in mind, and especially by this 



12 

side of the House, that the people are demanding, especially in view 
of the deficit now threatened in the Treasury, not that we sliall issue 
new bonds or create new debts or add to our taxation system, already 
the most bxirdensome in all the world, but they are demanding-, as a 
good housewife would demand about her domestic economy, that we 
cut down the expenses of tliis Government ; and if the Senate does not 
concur with us, there is their duty in the Constitution ; they can 
simply propose amendments. They should not cripple our efforts, nor 
stop the wheels of the state. To avoid this, is the very object of 
their inferior relations to the House on money bills. The Constitu- 
tion does not say that they shall stand there and insist and ad- 
hei'e to amendments and thus break down the machinery of the 
Government, but they are at liberty, as once the Peers of Eng- 
land were, to propose or to concur in amendments. Hence in the 
conference committee we may agree on many matters where mis- 
takes may have been made. But one thing is sure, Mr. Speaker, and 
gentlemen, that the main contest in the coming election will depend 
upon the fairness of those who seek the popular suffrage in reaching 
out after economy. The people do not want those economists who 
are all the time extravagant and who never go forward in the work 
of cutting down expenditures; men who, like some upon the other side 
of the House — thank God they are very few — think they are starving 
because they do not wear puiple and hue linen antl fare sumptuously 
every dav. 

Mr. FOSTER. Kentucky jean. [Laughter.] 

Mr. COX. It would be a very happy thing if more persons, l^oth 
republicans and democrats, wore homespun. It would be a good thing 
if the Government itself wore more horoespnu. [Laughter.] But 
what I am referring to is not so much what you put on, as how 
you behave. [Laughter and applause. J I do not care how my friend 
from Ohio is dressed, I respect him ; 1 suspect he is arrayed in tine 
linen ; perhaps in royal English Inoadcloth, upon which he has fixed 
a high tariff. [Laughter.] I am too near-siglited to see just how he 
is dressed, but the reporters will get it. I suspect that my friend is 
trying to affect some votes in Ohio and Indiana in our favor; I some- 
times suspect him, owing to some spasms of goodness, as having a 
little leaning to our side of the House. 1 am glad he has made this 
reference to an honest, iiiainly-dressed man, who has, as chairman of 
Accounts, been taking care of our accounts so honestly, and when he 
goes before the people of Indiana to give another account, as their 
man for governor, they will take good care of him. [Applause.] 

• MODE OF ENGLISH Al'PROrKIATIOXS. 

In the Commons, there is what would seem to us a paradox. When 
the supplies for the service of the year have all been granted, the 
Committee of Supply discontinues its sittings ; but then the Ways and 
Means Committee have yet to act. There is a revenue called a consoli- 
dated fund, and the several grants come out of it and a bill is passed 
to that effect. That is the English appro) )riation bill. The bill en- 
umerates all tlie grants of the session ; and, by a prudence we should 
imitate, it orders no illegal use of the supplies. 

When these formalities are complied with and the appropriation 
bill is passed both houses, then it is fit to receive the royal assent. It 
is handed back to the Commons, its source. When Parliament is 
prorogued, as I have seen it, l)y the lord commissioners — or, as some- 
times occurs, by the sovereign — the speaker carries the appropriation 
bill to the bar of the House of Peers. The speaker tells roj'alty that 



& 



13 

the Coninioiis have <j,iven the supplies, and the money bills receive 
assent. It is jiiven in the" old royal Noriuau French, and as said by a 
lady, it is (juite an elegance of politics: La rvyne rcinercie ses boits 
siijcts, accepte leur hctu'rohiice et auisi le vcult. A benevolence, a free 
gift, remember, not a forced loan from the Lords and Commons^ but 
from the Commons alone to the sovereign. The Peers sit humbly by 
and acrpiiesce. 

Sometimes the Commons votes grants of money with an assurance 
to make it good. There are a few other exceptional modes of raising 
and disl)urfiing money. I do not refer to them, although they defer 
ahvays to the iiialienal)le right of the Commons to dictate the uses of 
private nutans to public purposes. He who does not recognize this iu 
England mistakes her whole history. He who does not kuoAv that 
the Lords are as sheep before the shepherd, the Commons Ijeing the 
real House of Lords and the House of Lords the veriest commonplace, 
is illy read iu the history of Parliament and its struggles- 

MACAl'L.U'S LESSONS OX "MONEr BILLS." 

Perhaps no Englishman ever gave so careful a study of the prac- 
tice of Parliament under the English constitution as Lord Macaulay. 
Sometimes he searched a whole year to elucidate one reign or oue 
political epoch. Hi his third volume he reaches the era of William 
and jVIary. No portion of Engl ish history comes so near to our own oue 
hundred years ago as that whicli occurred during the revolution of 1(388. 
The ciicumstaiices which justified and the causes which produced 
that revolution were not dissimilar to our own. If stamp taxes were 
grievances to the colonies the ship-money had not been less grievous to 
Englishmen. Wheu the new settlement passed to William and Mary 
nobody denied that all duties which had been granted to the Crown 
tor a taxed term of years might be constitutiovially exacted till that 
term expired; but it was denied, and to tliemortilication aud disgust 
of the "Dutchman King," that tlie revenues which had been settled 
by Parliament on James II for life, could be claimed by William and 
Mary. Whether it was during the reign or life of James was con- 
tested by English statesmen. The House sided with Somers, and 
held that the defunct king could not have the revenues run with his 
person. Then began a splendid parliamentary effort for reform. It 
can be likened to no other in this country than that begun by this 
Congress against corruption and waste. Well does JSIacaulay iu 
summing u]) this i)ortion of the conliict remind us that '• during the 
couliict which lifteeu successive Parliaments had maintained against 
four successive kings, the chief weax)on of the Commons had been 
the power of the purse, (Macaulay, volume 11, page 36,) and never 
had the representatives been induced to surrender that weapon with- 
out having s])eody cause to repent of their too credulous loyalty." 

As during the reign of the Stuarts, so during the past ten yeai's of our 
history, Congress has been less vigilant than even the cavaliers of 
Charles in protesting against the large revenues and the abuses which 
disgraced every Department of the Government. There Avas no se- 
curity theu, as there is none now, against lualadmiuistration, except 
the frequent recurrences to the great popular council for pecuniary 
aid. Thereftne, the new dynasty began with a new system of sup- 
plies. The exchequer was call<'<l on for estimates. Immediate exigen- 
cies were v>rovided for. ]Moiit lily assessments were made. It is said 
that as William ma relied from Torbayto London the |)eop]eiinpoi tuned 
him, as they importune iis now, to relieve, them of their intolerable 
burdens. The chief of these was hearth-money. 



14 

HEARTH-MONEY. 

It Tvas the meanest tax ever levied, unless it be our tariff taxes on 
woolens, iron, and quinine. It was unequal. It pressed the poor ; it 
was light on the rich ; dukes paid but little more than peasants. 
Families were disturbed at meals ; bed-rooms were forced ; the very 
trencher on which the barley loaf was divided among the poor chil- 
dren and the pillow from under the head of the lying-in woman were 
taxed and seized by a remorseless hand. Besides, the tax was farmed 
out to rascals, Avhose counterpart is only to be found in our custom- 
houses. There was a tax in Rome once Avhich was levied upon the 
very offal of mankind. "My son," said an emperor, "the coin smells 
good, whatever may be the odor of the thing taxed." The hearth- 
money came in all too regularly, but was not of a pleasant savor, ex- 
cept to the goldsmiths who advanced money on it. .Where was the 
remedy 1 In the Lords ? Did they strike down this hearth-tax ? No ! 
The Commons was the refuge. It gave relief to the hearth, and the 
smoke that curled from the chimney of the English peasant was in- 
cense to the grand body of the people represented in the Commons. 

Again, in 1690, the revenue came again before the Commons. The 
reform had not been consummated. .Salaries and pensions wei'e enor- 
mous. Independent members, like Sedley, played their jests of pleas- 
antry on the civil list ; but sarcasm, jests, and invective fell power- 
less on the mailed form of tyranny. The civil list, however, only 
provoked ill-humor, which so(ui evaporated. It was so easy then as 
now to laugh off the details as little. The income in lieu of the old 
feudal services had remained. Appeals were made on behalf of 
William, who had saved the nation from popery, who had delivered 
the church from persecution. In vain whig and tory joined in the 
Commons against the incomes, and placed all disasters at the door of 
a too liberal Parliament in the days of the Stuarts. Experience had 
taught them ; and tliougli a compromise was made whereby some of 
the excise was fixed for life on tlie sovereign for the household and 
civil list, yet William growled at the grudging Commons ; but the 
Commons established a precedent and a principle, and protected pos- 
terity against indiscreet liberality, Avliile furnishing a code for a new 
hemisj)here. 

ENGLISH CIVIL LIST AND OUR OWN PRODIGALITY. 

I venture to say that upon this civil list — then considered by the 
king so meager — there was not so much prodigality as the last ten 
years show in this Congress. In recent Parliaments, Englishmen like 
Sir Charles Dilke have shown what extravagant largesses have been 
granted to the numerous family and dependents of the queen ! 

This republican member of Parliament putsto shame our republican 
pi'actice. The House may remember that this civil list was held sacred 
from parliamentary reduction during the whole reign. But Sir Cliarles 
held in 1872, as we hold now, that the House can examine into ex- 
penditures, if not question their right. How he tore the veil from the 
Englishpeusioners, the masters of the buck-hounds and fox-hounds and 
the yeomen of the guard! How he opeued to the shafts of ridicule 
the lord of the bed-chamber! How like the gentlemen of our Appro- 
priations Committee he stigmatized the sinecures and useless oliices; 
how he discovered the charlatanry of double offices with double 
salaries, like that of constable of Windsor — offices with only charges 
and no duty ; how he displayed the public expense for lordlings and 
princelings, for royal yachts and palace repairs, for masters of the 
horse and royal chamberlains, with duties more mysterious than 
proper, for robes, collars, and badges, for presents, missions, and 



15 

clothiug for royal trumpeters; bow lie opened the privy purse to the 
ridicule of seusible En.olislnueu ; how, in fine, he demauded reform 
in sustaining the carriages and equipages of great personages, can be 
found rehearsed in pure English in Hansard, ccx, page 254, and can 
be found equaled only in the corrupt days of France, when John 
Law gambled, or the worse days here when worse men rule. Talk 
about our post-traderships, District and whisky rings, navy-yards 
and naval frauds, exjiensive diplomatic nonsense, corrupt custom- 
houses, and worse Indian comiilications — all these in most unhappy 
detail, running into and out of Congress, through courts and into all 
the public service — these parasites nmst remain still further to fatten 
on the prevalent corruption. An honest Congress may not investi- 
gate nor even stay the unpleasant tide by fresh rules or by the ever- 
duriug power it holds over the ]iurse. Why ? Because the Senate 
says, no ! 

THE inOHEi; rOWEUS AXD DUTIES OF THE HOUSE. 

By an unexampled popular uprising the people sent to this Congress 
nearly a two-thirds majority favorable to economy and retrenchment. 
It was well known that the House had no power over general legisla- 
tion except in connection with the Senate and the President. But it 
was well known that in reference to retrenchment the House stood 
upon a higher plane, witli greater functions and more responsibility 
tban either Senate or President. It held the purse and it could with- 
hold supplies. It could open the purse and aliix conditions to the use 
of its contents. It could give or refrain as it pleased. It was the 
disburser, subject to certain conditions clearly fixed in the Constitu- 
tion and recognized by the traditions and practice under the British 
constitution. The Senate might modify our money bills to make them 
either more palatable or more just ; the President might approve or 
negative them ; and wliile the House is not in terms the exclusive 
legislature on this vital topic, its paramount voice was to be re- 
garded as, the creative voice. It cannot be disregarded without vio- 
lating the sjiirit and letter of the Constitution. 

The election of gentlemen here confers by the election the entire 
power possessed by the electors. Under our Constitution, luitil amend- 
ment, it is irrevocable. You, gentlemen, are butthedeputies of the peo- 
ple to carry out this parliamentary authority. If there is any defect in 
executing the electctral will, it is yours. You cannot go home, ducking 
to the Senate, without reproof from and damage to the constituent. 
You are not merely responsible to the first district of Ohio or the 
thirtieth district of New York. Your action binds your fellows. The 
safety and good of all are embraced in the Constitution, and you are 
the trustee for every person in the land. By jdelding to the Senate, 
on a question of supplies, you give up to strangers, or at best but re- 
mote relations, the economy of that household of which you are the 
stewards. Your indenture is written and interpreted. You durst not 
defer to those not parties in its particular execution. No pledges you 
have made as to this or that reform or retrenchment can change your 
relation to the Senate or to the Constitution. Your party fealty is 
nothing before your oath to the organic ordinance. Your instructions 
are crystallized and set. They are crown jewels of jiopular sover- 
eignty. In the matter of appropriations here, as supplies in Britain, 
you may be concurrent in a fractional incidental way, but you are 
independent in the integrity of your specific exclusive duty. 

If courtesy and conference fail to reconcile the two Houses, the 
responsibility falls on the branch which encroaches. There is no um- 
pire except the vote of the peoi)le in re-electing the House, or the 



16 

slower remedy in this country of reforming the Senate by filling the 
jilaces of expiring Senators. In England when the Lords become re- 
cusant the late and sure remedy is summary. A new set of peers are 
created by the ministry ; and the Commons become the creators and 
masters of the Peers. Therefore, for a stroiiger reason in this country, 
we must insist and adhere to our constitutional duty and trust to the 
righteous judgment of the people. 

lu all sciences — 

Says Lord Bacon — 

thoy are the soundest that keep close to jmrticnhirs. Inileerl, n science appears to 
lie best formed into a system by a number of instances drawn from observation and 
■espeiience, and reduced graduallj' iuto geuei'al rules. 

The mind which would make law without heeding minute particu- 
lars has neither observed the phenomena of the material world, nor 
understands the first clause of the social contract. 

From the numerous precedents of English history, interpreting or.r 
own Constitution, we may infer the inner meaning of that constitu- 
tion whicli gives to the House the controlling influence in money bills. 

COXGEESS TAKES ACTION IX 1672. 

In further illustration of the power of the House, let me refer to a 
report made to this House on the 27th February, 1871, (Forty-first 
Congress, third session. Report No. 42.) It seems that a committee 
of conference on the part of the House was charged with the duty of 
conferring with a similar committee of the Senate. A question of 
l)rivilege was raised by resolution of the House in reference to a tax 
bill. The bill had originated in the Senate. It continued the income 
tax until after December, 1869. A respectful resolution of the House 
called in question the power of the Senate. The bill was sent to the 
►Senate with the resolution. It involved a constitutional privilege of 
the House. True, it referred to the imposition of taxes, and not ap- 
jiropriations. At that time the House maintained its privilege. The 
report of that committee naturally looked to the British constitution 
as the model for our own on revenue matters. Was not the balance 
of power between the two Houses affected ? That report asserted 
that our constitutional clause was adopted as a compromise, and the 
committee took care to claim the sole power of the House to origi- 
nate " money bills." That power was considered by them a safeguard 
against the oppression of the people. It was therefore' considered as 
properly lodged in that body which most naturally reiireseuted and 
which Avas most directly controlled by the people. 

Eeferring to the British precedents which I have already quoted, the 
committee affirmed that the acquiescence of the Lords in the privileges 
of the Commons was of so clear a nature that the Lords could not amend 
money bills so as to alter the intention of the Commons. That in- 
tention went not only to the amount of the rate or charge, whether 
by increase or reduction, but to its duration, its mode of assessment, 
its levy, its collection, its ai)propriation, its management. It justifies 
in the precedents quoted, not merely the right of the House to origi- 
nate, but to appropriate and manage, by proper provisos and amend- 
ments, all moneys that come into the Treasury by taxation. Whoever 
shall pay, receive, mjinage, or control such monejns are within the rule 
laid down by the Constitution, copied in the spirit of jealous freedom 
from our British ancestors. 

THE COXSTITUTIGNAL COMl'liOMIoE. 

When our fathers considered the question of taxation and repre- 
sentation there was a contest for power between the large and small 



17 

States ; but the cduiproniise consisted in concessions to the small 
Htates, wliich were specifically counterbalauccd by the provisioTi that 
money bills should originate in the House of Eepresentatives, -where 
*the peo^ile vrere represented according to numbers. 

The origin of this clause as to money bills is attributed to Charles 
Pinckney in his notes of the Constitution, though Dr. Franklin af- 
ter introduced it in committee. The people's money should not be 
voted away by the Senators rei)resenting States. It was hold to be 
an aristocratic privilege to vote away other people's money regardless 
of the source from which it came, and for which thei'e was no direct 
responsibility. The people should know who disposed of their money, 
and how. " It is a maxim," said Dr. Franklin, " that those who 
feel can best judge." Hence, the House was given the paramount 
power over all money bills. Mr. Gerry considered the clause relative 
to money bills as the corner-stone of tlie accommodation between the 
large and small States. It is absolutely certain, as a careful study of 
the debates will disclose, that the words "money bills" as used in 
the British constitution, were the synonyms for the words " revenue 
bills" used in ours. Mr. Webster has used the words "money bills" in 
the same connection. The reasoning for this principle first grows 
out of the hereditary nature of the British House of Lords, and to 
the continuance and perpetuity of a body known as our Senate, each 
one of whose members holds through three successive Congresses. 
The English analogy is a more striking one the more it is considered. 
We even followed the English Committee on Ways and Moans in our 
First Congress, which was authorized not only to originate all reve- 
nue measures, but those of taxation and appropriation. This prac- 
tice is not peculiar to later days. In 1832 it was again asserted, and 
in other instances it was asserted by the control and to the destruc- 
tion of two appropriation bills : one in 1856 and another in l-^Go. To 
these I shall refer in det.TJl. 

Mr. Speaker, this is not a question of privilege altogether ; it is 
higher; it is a question of constitutional power. The House is the 
sole judge of the manner, the measure, and the time of imposing taxes 
or disbursing them. The committee to which I have referred, con- 
sisting of Messrs. Hoojjer, Allison, and Voorhees, followed the En- 
glish precedents which I have quoted, and deferred to the Senate only 
in its right to propose or concur with amendments. 

TWO AvruoruiATiox bu.ls failed IX twenty yeahs. 

This fjuestion of disagreement between the two Houses on appro- 
priation bills is neither new in this country nor in Eugland. The 
most conspicuous instances of disagreements in this country grew out 
of the legislation on the slavery question, and upon an Army bill. 
The Journal of the House of August 6, 18.56, shows the beginning of 
this disagreement. The House at tliat time was republican and the Sen- 
ate democratic. A proviso to the Army bill (Journal, page 1383) for- 
bade that the money appi-opriiited should be drawn from the Treas- 
ury until certain prosecutions in Kansas should be dismissed and 
those restrained of liberty released. This proviso passed the House 
by a vote of yeas 84, nays 09, almost a party vote. Colfax. Giddings, 
Grow, Wa^shburnc, and others voted for it. Another proviso substan- 
tially the same (page 1387) was passed — yeas «2, nays 611. The Sen- 
ate disagreed to the provisos, and tlie House insisted, on a motion by 
Mr. Stevens to recede. Tliere was a full vote, and the republican 
House insisted upon retaining the provisos. Tliat contest continued 
until the disagreement was so widi tiiat Congress adjourned, and the 

2 c 



18 

apptopiiatiou ])ill was iost. Tlie last vote, on a motion of Mr. Camp- 
bell for adherence, was 101 yeas to 97 nays. . 

On page 1622 of the Journal of August 30, the Army hill came back 
for the last time on this proviso : * 

That no part of the militaiy forces of the United States for the support of which 
appioiJiiationa are made by this act shall he employed in aid of the enforcement 
of any enactment heretofore passed of the bodies claiming to be the teiritorial 
Legislature of Kansas. 

Tbe vote on this proviso wns yeas 101, nays 98. This was a party 
vote. The present financial leader of the Senate, Mr. John Sher- 
man, voted against striking out the proviso, (page 1623.) It therefore 
appears by the action of this House, Avhen the republican party was 
virtuous and skilled in legislation that for the purpose of rescuing 
the soil of Kansas from the black stain of slavery they were willing 
to defeat the Army biil. 

I came into Congress the following sessi )n and the niaiu objection I 
had to combat on the stump in that canvass was the admirable stand 
taken by my competitor in favor of holding the purse of the Government 
against its use to sustain the evilspiiifcof slavery, the suspension of the 
habeas cwjms, and thebarbarouscode of the Legislature of Kansas. The 
speeches of that day are full of philippics against Draco and Jeffries, 
Russian serfdom and Spanish slavery. Standing armies were de- 
nounced; the dread of their violence and the dangers likely to ensue 
were held up in every light before the House and the country. It was 
stoutly maintained by the republican party in tbe day of itspurity that 
the sword should uot have -weight in the scale of American justice. 
Europe was appealed to with its 2,000,000 armed men. The songs of lib- 
erty were repeated upon this lioor as lyrics lost amid the clash of arms. 
Our Army was then but 14,000 strong, and, though the i>roviso did 
not annul the Kansas code, yet it declared it absolutely powerless and 
not to be enforced with the bayonet. Tlie proviso was held to be 
constitutional, legal, just, and reasonable. It was Congress aiul Con- 
gress alone which could use, as occasion retpiired, the money and the 
sword. The Senate was denounced as assuming a position memo- 
rable in the historic page of the Stuarts. Charles bad lost his head 
and James his crown. Revolution was openly proclaimed ; but it 
was revolutiou only against the known opinions of Senators. 

The House would not then bow before the Senate at its nod. 
Latin was summoned to aid the cause of the gallant republicans — 

Quicq^uid delirunt i eges, plectuntur Achivi — 
which was interpreted by scholarly republicans, " that when Sen- 
ators get mad the people feel the scourge." The result was that the 
Senate stood firm and the House firmer. The result showed subse- 
quently that the republican party made strength by their determina- 
tion to sustain the commonalty against the Senate. 

I have intimated that two appropriation bills have failed because 
of an irreconcilable disagreement between the two Houses. On the 
2d day of March, 1865, when the miscellaneous bill was under con- 
sideration, Mr. Henry Winter Davis, of Maryland, moved an addi- 
tional section to the bill. It was intended that no peison should be 
tried by court-martial or niilitarj^ commission in any State or Terri- 
tory where the courts of the United States were open with certain 
exceptions, and that all proceedings contrary to that proviso should 
be vacated. It was further held tliat all persons under sentence in that 
peculiar mode of trial should cither be discharged or delivered to the 
civil authorities. 



19 

On 111 iV proviso Mr. Waslibiirue, oi' Illinois, raised a point of ordei'; 
1)nt it Avas snl)so(iHently ruled in order by Schuyler Colfax, tite 
Speaker of tlie House. Mr. Davi.s strenuously and eloquently con- 
tended that wliile he would not cast any iiuput.ation upon the admiv- 
istration, he wo.ild confend aijainst destroying the foundation of the 
popular safety. WliiJe he confined the amendment to the so-called 
then loyal States, so as not to strip the Government of any power 
to supitiess rebellion, he rose to the height of a great argument for 
personal liberty, by annulling all illegal military commissions and 
enlarging all those illegally found unfter sentence of illegal military 
commissions. It must be remembered that this proviso was iutro- 
dnced into a republican House and by a republican. His spirit was- 
in.stinct with tlie virtue which belongs to our conmion freedom. He 
was ably seconded by the present Senator from New York, [Mr. Kek- 
NAX,] who gave instances of civilians of unimpeachable character be- 
ing thrown into prison and detained for nmuths and subjected to trial 
by military conunission for alleged violations of the statutes of New 
York, and only discharged when this military tribunal could lind 
nothing against them. 

The extreme measures of that Congress found champioushii> in the 
House of litipreseutativcs, and no threat of the defeat of the appro- 
IH'iation bill, involving millions, lessened the force of that champion- 
ship. Some sneered at it as a general jail delivery. Mr. Schenck wa& 
one of them. Mr. Stevens, while admitting that courts-martial were 
often composed of men ignoraut of law, refused to reverse such de- 
cisions and " turn loose God knows whom on the demand of the House 
of Representatives fixed to an appropriation bill." 

It is needless for me to refer to the details of that debate. It is 
enough to say that never was there exhibited in the best days of 
English ( ontest against i)rerogative, and in the conflict of the Com- 
mons against the King, more knoAvledgc and coolness. When that 
miscellaneous bill failed by the attack of freemen in a republican 
House, it was felt that civil law was still supreme, and that every 
man was able to breathe freer in the hope of the peaceful reign of 
liberty by submission to law ? 

Afterward, as will api)ear from the Globe of March 3, 18G.5, page 
1421, when the disagreement was again reported to the House cer- 
tain small provisions like that of light-houses and gas-light were 
agreed to. They were large in number and amount, and covered all 
the business details of the various amendments of the House. But 
when the conference committee reached the radical diversity of opin- 
ion, Mr. Davis stated that while the majority of the Senate concurred 
in the principles involved, the majority had refused in two votes to 
pass the amendments. It was insisted that the Senate might pass 
the proviso a« a separate bill ; but these lords of the Senate refused. 
An important a]ipropriation bill, with a proviso touclung the right of 
every citizen and the endurance of reiuiblican institutions, was re- 
ported back to the House lender a grave disagreement, and the funda- 
mental principles of liberty were viiulicated. The bad pi'actices of 
the Government introduced into the jurisprudence of the Federal 
Government under the general title of the rules and usages of war, 
together with new crimes without any authority, were regarded as 
of more conse((nence than the mere temporary provision of a miscel- 
laneous approi>riation bill. 

All honor to the genthimen of that Congress, not .ilways careful of 
personal liberty, but with a sufficient number of republicans to join 
with the democrats to vindicate the primary ideas of freedom. When, 



20 

therefore, at tvreive o'clock on the '.jt\ of March, 18G5, tlie Speaker 
anuotinced that the parting' hour had come, personal liberty stood 
high aloof above mercenary consideration, and the departino- Speaker 
in adjonrning the Thirty-eight Congress sine die made a lyric orison 
to the Father of us all that he would lead all our wandering citi- 
zens to the old fold. 

AYhile lieavon's wide arch resdinids ajjain, 
With 'peace ou earth, good will to mcu." 

Thus, Mr. Speaker, on two occasions, both of them in rcpnT»lican 
Houses, have the fundamental ideas inherited from our English an- 
cestry been vindicated, and the right of the Commons to iix condi- 
tions to the voting of money has lifted that standard by which alone 
through nearly a thousand years the safety of the public charters has 
been secured. 

Mr. Speaker, much discussion has been had and much bitterness 
created between the two Houses in reference to retrenchment. My 
relation to the House and its business deters me from any partisan 
appeal which would intrench upon the honor or respect due to the 
Senate. If there were no rules requiring the House to be decorous 
and complaisant toward that body, it would aftbrd me no gratihcatiou 
to disregard that moral comity which leads us into unison for the 
common weal. It is not to be regarded as overstepping the limits of 
discussion in which the temporary Speaker might pi'operly indulge 
in defense of the organization of the lower branch of Congress if he 
did point out — not merely from English precedent, not merely from 
the glorious history of the Commons, but from the present condition 
i)i our Treasury and its finances — the immense responsibility of that 
branch wdiich would reject any measure for the facile running of the 
Government. 

EXl'EXDITUKKS INCREASE. 

This Congress was called into being to restrain, inordinate living 
beyond our resources. "When our expenditures exceed our means it 
is time for an aggressive spirit on the part of the people and their 
representatives against all comers who would attack them. Need I 
refer you to the increased expenditures of the administration since 
the war ended? Comparisons between IHGO and 1S70 or 1875 seem to 
fail of their cogency. Let me, then, take some of the years imme- 
diately after the war. 

The post-office expenditures in 1868 were $10,000,000 less than now. 
The Indian expenditures are nearly $4,000,000 more now tbanin 1868. 
Why should we appropriate for surveying the public lands uearly four 
times as much in 187.5 as in 1868, or double our Coast Survey expenses 
in the same period ? Why should the Judicial expenditures rush up 
from $700,000 to over three and a half millions from 1868 to 1875 1 
Why should our miscellaneous expenditures in the same period be 
$20,000,000 more ? Are these burdens of such a character as to be 
patiently borne ? Is our present time so auspicious and prosperous that 
we can alibrd to add to instead of subtracting from our expendi- 
tures ? 

Besides, it is susceptible of proof from an authentic statement of 
the condition of the Treasury up until June 30, 1876, there will be a 
deficiency at the end of the present fiscal year of over twenty-four 
millions and a half. And the probable deficiency at the end of the 
year 1877 will be over $40,000,000. 

Such a condition of public finances calls either for debt, taxes, or 
thrift. If England could hold the purse-string against the Crown, 



4 



' 21 

antl il, throunh ;i rciiiaikalile struggle, a republican Congress could 
bold tbe purse for liberty iu Kansas, for habeas corpus, free speech, 
and free press ; if a republican Congress led by the eloquence of 
Henry AVinter Davis could break down the miscellaneous bill, by a pro- 
viso for a fair trial under an American bill of rights and the spirit of 
Magna Charta, hovr craven ami contemptible would not a democratic 
Congress seem should they adopt the imdget fixed by a Senate in its 
arrogance, and in derogation of every legislative right and privilege? 

It is unnecessary for me to state iu detail what bills we have 
offered to the Senate for retrenchment. I have already spoken as to 
the military and diplomatic bills. The reductions on these bills were 
generally concurred in. Upon the first it amounted to $200,000 below 
the esiiiuates. The diplomatic bfll was reduced from the estimates 
near one-half million. In the fortiiication bill there was a reduction 
of over three millions. Upon tlie legislative, executive, and judicial 
appropriation bill, to whicli the Senate have made nearly a thousand 
amendments, we had proposed a reduction of over five and a half 
millions. On the river and harbor bill the reduction of appropria- 
tions below the estimate amounted to $770,000. On the deficiency 
bill we reduced from the appropriation of last year nearly $4,000,000 ; 
on the post-office bill more than $.5,000,000 ; on the naval bill over 
$4,000,000 ; and on the Indian bill over one and a half millions. Or, 
sir, to sum it all up, the reduction on the bills thus far reported shows 
as in comparison with the estimates a reduction of $37,738,000, -while 
the actual appropriations for the present year show a reduction thus 
far of nearly $23,000,000. The Army bill will show a reduction of 
appropriation of nearly $.5,000,000. So that in the sum-total this 
pains-taking economy of the House of Eej)resentatives has labored 
to make an aggregate reduction amounting to $40,000,000. These 
details will be approved by a prostrate and a discriminating people. 

I do not propose now to argue for or against the propriety or the 
utility of these reductions. They have had careful consideration 
in the committee and unexampled debate in the Committee of the 
Whole. Many of them have been approved without a vote against 
them. The Senate may in the end generally approve of our retrench- 
ment, but the conciliatory disposition thus far seems lacking. Upon 
this retrenchment not only depend matters of a fiscal nature con- 
nected "with currency, economy, taxation, and iucorniptibility, but, 
sir, there is at stake the very organic law of constitutional liberty, 
derived from our English ancestors and our own American fathers. 
We demand that no servile submission to an inferior body should be 
shown by this the superior body under the sanctions of the Consti- 
tution. 

COXCLUSIOX. 

In conclusion, there is but one path leading out of this cave of de- 

iiair. We must break the lull and work. Public confidence will come 
nly as wo arc assured that values are no longer wasted, but created. 
The path may be rough and the wilderness and sloughs difficult. Our 
path does not lie simply in the repeal of any foolish act for resump- 
tion at an early and impossible day. The extension of that day is not 
the only jiath, though it may remove many impediments. The ex- 
tension of resumption nuist hot involve, as a condition, iudefuiite 
postponement. We have riches, developed and undeveloped, for our 
wants, if those wants are not too imaginative. We must prepare even 
for a greater shrinkage of values ; we must prepare for sacrifices. 
But one sacrifice we must not make : We cannot sacrifice the tradi- 
tions, muniments, and dignities of this House of the i)eople, this House 



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